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 ROBERT LENSINK
 ELMER STERKEN
 The Option to Wait to Invest and
 Equilibrium Credit Rationing
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that firms considering risky pro-
 jects have higher reservation interest rates and hence it is optimal
 for a bank to reduce loan supply. In this note we show that when
 the risk involved in an investment will be resolved in the future, in-
 vestors with riskier projects have a greater return from waiting.
 More risky projects have lower reservation interest rates and hence
 there is no motive for banks to ration credit demand.
 STIGLITZ AND WEISS (1981) show that asymmetric infor-
 mation may lead to a situation where, among observationally identical loan appli-
 cants, some get a loan whereas others are denied credit. The key to this result is the
 assumption that the payoff for the investor is an increasing function of the riskiness
 of the investor's project. High-risk investors are willing to pay a higher lending rate
 for a loan. This implies that the cutoff lending rate above which a firm decides not to
 invest, the so-called reservation rate, is the lowest for the least risky loan applicant.
 Banks know the expected return of the project, but cannot distinguish between bad
 (low-risk) and good (high-risk) firms. An increase in the lending rate has two oppo-
 site effects on bank returns. On one hand, it increases the average rate of return for
 banks because banks earn more interest on the loan. On the other hand, it causes
 loan applicants with the lowest risk to drop out of the loan market. Above a certain
 threshold lending rate the negative effect will dominate, so the optimal policy for the
 bank is to ration credit and not to raise the lending rate. The message is that equilib-
 rium rationing is a rational choice.
 In the Stiglitz-Weiss (SW) model the choice given to the firm is to invest or not to
 invest given that investment is irreversible. However, there is no possibility for the
 firm to wait. The literature (see, for example, McDonald and Siegel 1986) shows that
 there might be a positive option value of waiting (or early abandonment). In this note
 we show that in a simple reformulation of the Stiglitz-Weiss model for a world
 where uncertainty will be resolved in the future and the investor has the possibility to
 wait, credit rationing does not occur. The results of this paper illustrate that when the
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 decision is whether to invest before it is known whether a project will be successful
 or after, the investors with riskier projects have a greater return from waiting. Since
 the return for delay is highest for the borrowers with the riskier projects, they are the
 last to invest immediately as the interest rate rises. This implies that an increase in
 the lending rate by banks drives the bad firms out of the loan market and not the
 good firms as is the case in the Stiglitz-Weiss model. This result reduces the empiri-
 cal relevance of credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz-Weiss.
 1. STYLIZED VERSION OF THE STIGLITZ-WEISS MODEL
 We start by summarizing the main elements of the SW model in the context of the
 model we use hereafter. The model includes two types of agents: one commercial
 bank and different types of risk-neutral loan-applying firms. Each firm holds an in-
 vestment opportunity. In contrast to the original SW model we assume a rudimentary
 multi-period setting. In fact, we have an infinite number of periods but the basic
 choice problem is concentrated on two periods. The state of the world in the first pe-
 riod (t=O) is known and before the information is revealed projects cannot fail (so
 there is no advantage for riskier projects in the first period). In the second period
 (t= 1) and thereafter (to infinity) there is a good and a bad state. We suppose that
 once a certain state is reached in the second period, this state will continue to infin-
 ity. The decision on the size of the capital stock is made in the first period: for the
 sake of simplicity we assume investment I to be equal to the size of the capital stock
 K. Firms have an amount of initial wealth W, which we assume to be smaller than the
 amount needed to invest (1). Hence, the (investing) firm demands a loan L=I-W.
 The bank supplies loans at a rate r.1 If a firm invests, the payoff in the first period is
 equal to PO, which we assume to be smaller than the initial investment I. Empirical
 observations on the expected lifetime of capital goods illustrate that it is plausible to
 assume that the first-period payoff is likely to be less than the amount invested (see,
 for example, Jorgenson 1996, p. 46). In the good state the return in the second period
 is Ri, where i indicates the firm type. In the bad state the return is assumed to be zero
 (but this assumption can be relaxed straightforwardly). In line with Stiglitz and
 Weiss, we assume that the expected return of all projects is equal. The firms differ
 with respect to the return when the project is successful (Ri) and the probability of
 success (qi). A decrease in qi means greater risk in the sense of a mean-preserving
 spread (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Banks know that projects differ in riski-
 ness, but they are unable to observe which projects are risky and which are not. The
 assumption of equal returns for all projects i implies
 R _ iR. (1) Po +qi i - P + . =A (1) t= l (1+ r) r
 1. For ease of exposition we assume that the loan rate r is also used to discount future cash flows.
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 for all i, where A is the expected present value of all projects. Rewriting gives Ri =
 r(A-Po)/qi, again for all i. It can now easily be seen that in this arbitrage-free world
 the risky project has higher returns if it is successful.
 For a positive net present value (NPVit=0o) a firm will decide to invest. It is impor-
 tant to note that the returns Ri are assumed to be independent of the initial invest-
 ment, since this amount is the same for all firms. The net present value for firm i
 (NPVit=o) equals [using equation (1) and I= W+L]:
 oo 1
 NPVi,=0 -I + L + Po - rL + (R - rL)qi =-W- L(r+q) +A. (2)
 =l (Il+ r)t
 The reservation interest rate is the interest rate above which the firm decides not to
 invest. Hence, the reservation rate is obtained by setting the NPV t=o equal to zero:
 A-W
 ri= - qi- (3) L
 From equation (3) it can be seen that the firm with the highest qi, that is, the low-risk
 projects, has the lowest reservation rate (dr/dqi=- 1). This is basically the Stiglitz-
 Weiss result. If banks increase the lending rate, the lending rate may surpass the
 reservation rate of the good borrowers and hence the pool of loan applicants be-
 comes worse. The natural thing for a bank to do is to reduce loan supply.
 2. THE RESERVATION INTEREST RATE WHEN FIRMS HAVE THE OPTION TO WAIT
 In the former section, investment is modeled as a decision to be taken now or
 never, assuming irreversibility and nonexpandability (see Abel et al. 1996). However,
 the theory of investment under uncertainty emphasizes that it might be profitable to
 wait to invest in order to obtain more information on the state of the world relevant
 to the project. The sign of the investment uncertainty relationship depends on a large
 number of phenomena, such as the degree of competition and returns to scale (Ca-
 ballero 1991), production factor substitutability (Hartman 1976), time to build (Bar-
 Ilan and Strange 1996), etc. If one does not assume constant marginal productivity of
 capital through time (for instance, due to variable returns to scale or market power),
 the higher the reverting costs are the larger the probability of a negative impact of
 uncertainty on investment will be.
 The theory of investment under uncertainty treats a real investment decision like
 exercising a financial call option. The equivalence between a decision to exercise a
 call option and a real investment decision may be clear. An investor, having the op-
 portunity to invest and being uncertain about future variables affecting the probabil-
 ity of a project, may decide to wait for more information and hence may decide to
 delay her investment (McDonald and Siegel 1986). Real option theory implies that
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 the standard net present value rule for investment, as used in the former section, has
 to be amended by taking into account that once the investment has been made, the
 option to invest does not longer exist. Somewhat loosely stated: investors need to be
 compensated for the loss in value related to the disappearance of the investment op-
 portunity when the investment has been exercised. On the other hand, postponing the
 decision has benefits (more information on the state of the world), but also foregone
 receipts from sales.
 The option value is calculated by subtracting the NPVi,t=o as calculated in the for-
 mer section from the NPV,t=,, which denotes the NPV discounted back to t=0, when
 firm i waits until t= 1. For this NPVi,= 1 we assume that the investment is only under-
 taken for positive profit cases. Entrepreneurs can costlessly learn whether their pro-
 ject will succeed or fail by delaying one period. We assume that all information is
 revealed in the second period. Moreover, a potential borrower will not exit the mar-
 ket in response to an interest rate increase, but will just delay the investment deci-
 sion. For sake of simplicity, we also refrain from entry of new projects. The NPVt= 1
 for firm i equals
 NPVi=i l+ -W+l r Ri-qiL=A- i W-Po -qiL (4) ',1 -1l+  r l+r
 The value of the option to wait (Vi) is the difference between NPVit=1 and NPVit=,
 hence:
 1- (1jj^)W-P0+rL. (5)V (1i )W-Po .
 If the option value is positive, the firm will wait to invest and not demand the loan. Vi
 is increasing in the interest rate r, since the first-period revenue P0 is independent of
 r, while short-run costs (borrowing and opportunity costs) are increasing in r. More-
 over, Vi is decreasing in qi. As can be seen from the option value, a high first-period
 return P0 will increase the probability that a firm invests immediately. Even a high-
 risk project (low qi) will be undertaken in the first period for a high and certain first-
 period return. We therefore limit the first-period return to a maximum less than the
 initial investment: P0<I. It is again possible to calculate the reservation rate for a
 firm above which it decides not to invest by setting the option value equal to zero,
 hence:
 qi Po-rL-W W
 - - - =0. (6)
 l+r W
 The second term represents the relative net return in the first period before uncer-
 tainty is resolved and the first term adds the effect of waiting. The effect of a de-
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 crease in riskiness of the project on the reservation rate can be obtained by implicit
 differentiation with respect to r and qi. We multiply equation (6) by (1 +r) and dif-
 ferentiate the equation implicitly: (W-Po+(2r+1)L)dr-Wdqi=O. Again using
 I= W+L, this results in
 dr W
 dqi I-P +2rL (7)
 The sign of the effect of an increase in qi on r is strictly positive for Po<I. So projects
 with a low first-period return will experience an increase in the reservation rate for
 lesser risk. This shows that for less-risky projects (with a high qi) the reservation rate
 is higher than for the risky projects. It implies that in our model, where firms have no
 costs of learning whether the project will succeed or fail by delaying one period,
 banks do not have to fear that an increase in the lending rate in the case of an excess
 demand for loans will drive out the good projects. Quite to the contrary, an interest
 rate increase will induce borrowers who would have undertaken the riskiest projects
 to delay investment.
 3. CONCLUSION
 In this note we show that more risky investors have a greater return from waiting
 when waiting reveals information about the project type. Therefore, an increase in
 the borrowing rate will induce risky investors to delay investment. This is in contrast
 to the result of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), where banks decide to ration credit since
 riskier projects have higher reservation rates.
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